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1

OVERVIEW

Some critics of political liberalism claim that the view unjustifiably coerces religious
citizens into giving public reasons for their political positions. This is known as the integrity
objection. These critics claim that, because religious beliefs can comprise the totality of a
religious person’s life, to exclude these beliefs from playing a justificatory role in public political
debate is unjustifiable. Interestingly enough, oftentimes those who raise this objection claim that
they accept political liberalism as a theory. They merely think that it needs to be revised so as to
avoid this objection. My core aim in this thesis is to both dispute the objection itself, and
likewise dispute those liberals who seek to alter political liberalism.
In my first section, I explain Kevin Vallier’s formulation of the integrity objection.
Political liberals require that when voting on basic principles of justice and constitutional
essentials, legislators appeal solely to shared political values to justify those principles. However,
by nature, religious values are not political values. This is due to the fact that religious values are
not shared by all members of society. Vallier claims that this exclusion of religious justifications
from public political debate violates religious citizens’ freedom of conscience, and is
unjustifiable. In response to this I argue that because religious citizens in a politically liberal
society are reasonable – that is, because they accept that other people reasonably hold different
beliefs than they do, and because they seek fair terms of cooperation with their fellow citizens –
they accept that appealing to their own comprehensive doctrines as justification for basic
principles of justice and constitutional essentials is unjustifiable. Further, political liberals
provide places in the public political forum for citizens to make use of their comprehensive
doctrines. Here, the role of a comprehensive doctrine is explanatory rather than justificatory. For
these reasons, the integrity objection does not apply to political liberalism.

2

In the second section I then turn to one attempt to alter political liberalism so as to avoid
the integrity objection. In their paper “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified
Polity,” Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier highlight all the features of political liberalism that they
think make it vulnerable to the integrity objection. They claim that political liberals err in their
development of the theory but that properly revised the view can survive criticism. I, however,
deny that such errors actually exist. I do this by showing that Gaus and Vallier’s critiques are
themselves based on errors in understanding the core commitments of political liberalism. Once
we understand these commitments, we will see that these alleged errors are non-existent.
It is important to note that I will only defend one version of political liberalism in this
thesis: Rawlsian political liberalism. This means that it is possible – and perhaps likely – that
there are conceptions of political liberalism which are prone to both the integrity objection and
the errors of explication. My aim is solely to show that if there is a version of political liberalism
which is not prone to the integrity objection, then it is prime facie preferable. Likewise, if there is
a version of political liberalism which is not subject to the errors of explication, then there is no
reason why political liberals ought to feel the need to alter political liberalism to account for
these errors.
2

THE WIDE VIEW OF PUBLIC REASON AS A RESPONSE TO THE
INTEGRITY OBJECTION
2.1

Introduction

John Rawls claims that the long-term stability of democratic liberal societies depends on
guaranteeing the legitimacy- read acceptability- of basic principles of justice and constitutional
essentials. He develops political liberalism to offer an account of how this kind of stability is
possible. In his theory, he couches the justification for basic principles of justice in public
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reasons that appeal only to political values that all members of society can share. Some critics
object that Rawls’s idea of public reason is problematic because it is unjustifiable to certain
religious citizens. On Rawls’s view, citizens are prohibited from justifying basic principles on
the grounds of their own comprehensive doctrines: yet some religious citizens, it is claimed, will
want to make use of their comprehensive doctrines in the public political sphere.1 This criticism
is known as the integrity objection. In this section, I deny that the integrity objection is a problem
for Rawlsian political liberals. I do this by showing that the integrity objection - in what I take to
be its strongest version2 - ignores the wide view of public political culture. I first argue that,
because those who raise the integrity objection seek to attack liberalism “on its own terms,” the
religious citizens it purports to speak for will be reasonable. Due to this, they accept that offering
reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines as justification for basic principles of justice would
violate the criterion of reciprocity, which they endorse. I next argue that while it is true that the
use of reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines to justify basic principles of justice would
violate the criterion of reciprocity it would be incorrect to view public reasoning as the only
aspect of public political discussion. A proper understanding of the wide view will offer an
account of political liberalism that will answer the integrity objection.
2.2

Political Liberalism

There are two impetuses that move Rawls to develop his version of political liberalism.
First, Rawls’s goal is to develop a theory in which a liberal democratic society is stable, not
merely as a modus vivendi but stable “for the right reasons.” Here he means that citizens hold a

1

Rawls does think that citizens can make use of their comprehensive doctrines in the public political sphere, but only when
proper public reasons are forthcoming. He calls this the proviso.
2
I think Kevin Vallier offers the best statement of the integrity objection. See his “Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity,”
Austalasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 149-165.
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“firm allegiance” to the basic principles of justice and principles of society.3 In order to attain
this, public political discussion must produce legitimate basic principles of justice and
constitutional essentials4. Thus, in order to achieve long-term stability, Rawls focuses on the
justification for legitimate law.
Second, Rawls believes he must account for the “fact of reasonable pluralism”: a society
with free institutions will contain a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that conflict
with one another.5 People who possess “similar powers of thought and judgment” and who are
given the same evidence about a particular subject will come to different conclusions about that
subject based on facts about their individual psychologies. Those facts which cause this
divergence Rawls terms the burdens of judgment.6 Rawls does not see reasonable pluralism as a
problem for liberals, but he thinks this fact has important implications for theorizing about
liberalism.
Rawls thinks that “reciprocity of justification”7 is central to political legitimacy and his
account of public reason shows how it is possible for his criterion of reciprocity to be met given
the fact of reasonable pluralism. If society is to be stable for the right reasons, then the basic
principles of justice must be legitimate. However, due to the fact of reasonable pluralism citizens
must limit the types of justifications that can be given. If the burdens of judgment did not exist,
we might think that there is one right value, or one right set of values, and beliefs which people
ought to hold. We would only need to offer justifications based upon those values and beliefs,
and reasonable people would accept that those were right. However, given the burdens of
3
John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 589.
4
I shall use basic principle of justice as shorthand for this.
5
Ibid., 573–574.
6
Rawls provides a comprehensive account of these facts in Lecture II §2 of Political Liberalism. This account includes the fact
that evidence is often difficult to evaluate, and determining which and to what extent considerations are important is likewise
difficult. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 56–57.
7
Samuel Richard Freeman, Rawls (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 375.
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judgment, reasonable citizens acknowledge that reasonable people can disagree about what is of
value and how the world is. In other words, persons disagree about the values and beliefs for part
or the whole of life.
At this stage, Rawls introduces the criterion of reciprocity: “Our exercise of political
power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political
actions –were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably
think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.”8 The criterion of reciprocity
is central for legitimacy: if the criterion is satisfied, then basic principles of justice will be
legitimate. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls thinks that in order to satisfy this
criterion, public justifications must be based upon values that all citizens can share as citizens.
These values will include the freedom and equality that all citizens possess and other political
values.9 When a person gives a justification for a basic principle of justice that is based on “a
certain ordering”10 of shared political values that he reasonably believes other people can accept
as reasonable, he is giving a public reason.11
Rawls makes a distinction between public reason for officials in government and for
ordinary citizens. Judges, legislators, and political candidates have a legal duty to provide only
public reasons in the public political forum.12 Rawls thinks a duty of public reason also applies to
citizens. They must “think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what
statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity they would think it

8

Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 578.
For Rawls’s account of political freedom see: Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19; For Rawls’s account of political equality see
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 34; For Rawls’s account of other political values see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 376.
10
Ordering refers to the importance that one ascribes to each political value. Although all persons have the same political values,
the way they interpret the demandingness of those values can differ.
11
Rawls thinks that any reason that satisfies the criterion of reciprocity is a public reason. However because of the fact of
reasonable pluralism the only reasons that can meet the criterion of reciprocity are those supported by shared political values.
12
For the explication of the different duties imposed on each of these three groups see Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited,” 575.
9
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most reasonable to enact.”13 He calls this the duty of civility and labels it an “intrinsically moral
duty.”14 Importantly, Rawls does not think that the duty of civility requires citizens to never
introduce their comprehensive doctrines into public political discussion. He introduces the
proviso which allows citizens to “introduce into political discussion at any time” their specific
comprehensive doctrine “provided that, in due course, [they] give properly public reasons to
support the principles and policies [their] comprehensive doctrine is said to support”15
Importantly, Rawls thinks that not every person who engages in public reasoning will
adopt the same public reasons, or endorse the same principles of justice. Rather, they will argue
for those principles of justice and adopt those public reasons which seem to them the most
reasonable.16 Rawls defines the list of all the principles of justice and constitutional essentials one
reasonably supports and the public reasons that one offers as justification for those basic
principles of justice as that person’s “political conception of justice.”17 Rawls thinks there are a
myriad of political conceptions of justice that are reasonable. His preferred model is justice as
fairness, although he argues that conceptions such as Habermas’ discourse model will also be
reasonable.18
Rawls argues that any reasonable political conception of justice will have certain
features.19 Due to the fact that reasonable political conceptions must be able to fully determine
the principles of justice one ought to support, they must contain a list of the “basic rights,
liberties, and opportunities” that all citizens have access to.20 Likewise they must assign a certain
ordering to those values and contain “measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose
13

Ibid., 576.
Ibid., 577.
15
Ibid., 584.
16
Ibid., 577.
17
Ibid., 581.
18
Ibid., 582.
19
Rawls uses the term ‘conception’ as shorthand for political conceptions of justice and ‘doctrine’ as shorthand for
comprehensive doctrines. I shall do the same. Ibid., 573n.
20
Ibid., 581.
14
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means to make effective use of their freedoms.”21 In addition to the requirements for the content
of political conceptions of justice, Rawls adds three other conditions. (1) Political conceptions of
justice specify only the basic principles of justice, and social institutions- constitutional
essentials- that one ought to support. (2) They can be worked out from shared political values
alone. (3) They can be presented without reference to any comprehensive doctrine.22 So long as
these criteria are met, a citizen has a proper political conception of justice. Rawls states that:
“when, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all appropriate government
officials act from and follow public reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves
ideally as if they were legislators following public reasons, the legal enactment expressing the
opinion of the majority is legitimate law.”23 Stability of society is achieved when (1) a society is
governed by the most reasonable political conceptions of justice or by a “reasonable family of
such conceptions”; (2) those political conceptions are supported by political values; and (3)
public reasons are offered for basic principles of justice.24
2.3

The Integrity Objection

Political liberalism is concerned with securing the stability of society for the right
reasons, by ensuring the legitimacy of basic principles of justice which requires the satisfaction
of the criterion of reciprocity. Kevin Vallier claims that by requiring that only public reasons
count as justification for basic principles of justice, Rawls’ account of public reasons violates the
criterion of reciprocity by unjustifiably abridging the integrity of certain citizens.25 Vallier takes
the term integrity to mean that one has fidelity to his/her projects.26 A project is defined as those
goals that a person has that persist for extended periods of time, can explain the actions that
21

Ibid., 581.
Ibid., 584.
23
Ibid., 578.
24
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 391.
25
I use integrity as a technical term in this paper.
26
Vallier, “Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity,” 155.
22
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he/she takes, and structure his/her “reasons and plans.”27 At least for some people,
comprehensive doctrines – or aspects thereof - can be considered projects. For example, a fervent
Catholic may structure his/her life faithfully in accordance with what the Catholic Church
teaches. Also, importantly, political liberals think that integrity is important. As Vallier argues,
“public reason liberalism aims to treat citizens as free and equal under conditions of reasonable
pluralism, thereby allowing citizens with different conceptions of the good the liberty to act on
their projects and plans. Thus, a commitment to public justification implies a commitment to
respecting the integrity of citizens.”28 A violation of any citizen’s integrity will be prima facie
worrisome to liberals.29
When the idea of public reason is adopted by a society, a religious citizen may feel
marginalized because he is asked to “privatize” his beliefs.30 This occurs when he is asked to give
a public justification for whatever political action he votes for. As Vallier describes it, a public
justification can only come from a pool of public reasons which are acceptable by consensus.31
Because, for the religious citizen, his comprehensive doctrine is a project, he wishes to use it as
the basis for his decisions in all aspects of his life, including the public political sphere. It has a
primacy that pervades all aspects of his life, not merely non-political parts. Privatization will
require him to “split” his identity between who he is in his political life and who he is in his nonpolitical life.32 Unless justified, the splitting of identities can be considered wrong, because of the
commitments that liberals possess to integrity. Thus the integrity objection becomes a demand to
justify the privatization of personal doctrines to those with fidelity to their comprehensive

27

Ibid., 156
Ibid.,161.
29
It is important to note here that Vallier takes the integrity objection only to be an attack on the duty of civility. He does not
think anyone will see it as a problem that judges must be held to only using public reasons to render a verdict. Ibid., 157.
30
Ibid., 149.
31
Ibid., 151–152.
32
Ibid., 157.
28
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doctrines or to abandon public reasons altogether. Vallier sees only one way that political liberals
can avoid the integrity objection: they must deny that there is really a conflict between integrity
and public reason.33
2.4

Problems with the Formulation of the Integrity Objection

There are two ways that commentators have tried to argue that there is no conflict
between integrity and public reasoning. The first is to claim that political liberalism must be
altered in some way so as to avoid the integrity objection. One way to do this is by changing the
criterion of reciprocity into a less stringent intelligibility requirement.34The second is to claim
that denying religious reasons from counting as public reasons is justifiable.35 I aim to defend a
third option: One can exclude comprehensive doctrines from public reasoning while still
affording them a place in the public political sphere of society. A proper account of Rawls’s
wide view of public political discussion will show how (1) citizens can express their
comprehensive doctrine in the public, political sphere at any time (but not as justifications for
basic principles of justice), and (2) there is a fundamental connection between a person’s
comprehensive doctrine and his political conception of justice that structures how he engages in
political discussion. In this way, public reasons can still satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. At the
same time this option allows a primary role for doctrines in the public political sphere for those
with fidelity to those doctrines. Thus it satisfies the integrity objection.
The apparent dichotomy for the religious citizen between the prescription for public
reasons and his religious reasons is not nearly as clear-cut as it appears at first glance. According
33

Ibid., 161.
See Vallier, “Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity”; Gerald F. Gaus and Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a
Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism
35 (2009): 51–76.
35
See Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”; Christie Hartley and Lori Watson, “Feminism, Religion, and Shared
Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 493–536.
34
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to the conditions of the integrity objection, the religious citizens in question are still reasonable.36
For Rawls, there are two basic criteria required for a citizen to be reasonable.37 The first is a
“willingness” to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation “provided others do.”38 The
second is “the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and accept their
consequences.”39 A reasonable citizen, then, is one who already has substantial commitments to
the workings of the public political sphere of society. The criterion of reciprocity requires that
persons offer fair terms of cooperation that other reasonable citizens can reasonably accept.40 A
person who searches for fair terms of cooperation will endorse the criterion of reciprocity.
Second, because this citizen recognizes the burdens of judgment, he understands that he cannot
offer his reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines as justifications for basic principles of
justice, because he cannot reasonably expect others to accept his controversial reasons. Thus, in
seeking to confront political liberalism on its own terms and claiming that even reasonable
citizens will find public reasoning problematic, integrity objectors have already ceded the fact
that reasonable religious citizens find public reasoning the best way to meet the criterion of
reciprocity. Those who raise the integrity objection either explicitly or implicitly accept political
liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity and its ultimate goal of stability for the right reasons.
Insofar as the religious citizen in question is reasonable he is committed to the criterion
of reciprocity. He likewise realizes that other citizens hold different views from him and are still
reasonable. From these two facts he cannot possibly conclude that it would be acceptable for him
to offer his views based on his own comprehensive doctrine as justification for the basic

36

This follows from the fact that the integrity objection seeks to confront political liberalism on its own terms.
Rawls and others think that there is more to being reasonable than meeting these two criteria. However there is no consensus
among political liberals about what the precise definition of reasonableness is. Therefore I will use these two criteria so that
anybody whose definition of reasonableness contains them will agree with my interpretation.
38
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 54.
39
Ibid.., 54.
40
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 578.
37
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principles of justice of society. This leads him to one of two options: the first is to accept that the
exclusion of justifications of basic principles of justice based upon comprehensive doctrines is
reasonable based upon a commitment to reciprocity. The second is to reject the criterion of
reciprocity on these grounds.
Some may dispute that this is a false dichotomy. It may be possible that a reasonable
person legitimately questions why public reasons are the best way to gain stability. Yet it should
be noted that those objectors’ problems with political liberalism begin far before the stage of
public reasoning. Rawls makes it clear that “those who reject constitutional democracy with its
criterion of reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason.”41 Vallier likewise
agrees that the integrity objection is worrisome because it “violates political liberalism on its
own terms.”42
It is possible to make the argument that it is wrong to expect persons to pick the
commitment to public reasons over the rejection of reciprocity. A reasonable religious citizen
may agree with the criterion of reciprocity and the burdens of judgment but think that reciprocity
is self-defeating. Integrity is important for this citizen, and part of the appeal of political
liberalism is that the criterion of reciprocity is supposed to help secure integrity. If it turns out
that certain features of public reasoning hinder the integrity of certain citizens unjustifiably, then
this presents a serious problem for political liberals. Thus, the question that political liberals
should be focused upon is not whether a reasonable religious citizen has sufficient reasons to
accept a principle of justice justified by a public reason, for she most assuredly does, but whether
political liberals unjustifiably keep her from making use of his doctrine in the public political

41
42

Ibid., 574.
Vallier, “Liberalism, Religion, and Integrity,” 150.
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sphere. Unjustifiable exclusion of reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines would violate the
criterion of reciprocity and make the basic principles of justice of a society illegitimate.
2.5

The Wide View of Public Political Culture as a Framework

To repeat the base claim of integrity objectors: exclusion of reasons based upon
comprehensive doctrines from the public political sphere of society is unjustifiable to those with
fidelity to their comprehensive doctrines. However it is not immediately clear that having
integrity in the public political sphere of society requires the ability to express one’s own
comprehensive doctrines as a justification for basic principles of justice. Rawls does not restrict
the public political sphere only to public reasoning. He offers an additional account of public
discourse which he calls “the wide view of public political culture.”43 This distinction is
important in Rawls’ work because although his account of public reasoning spells out how the
criterion of reciprocity is met given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the wide view offers ways
in which the stability of society can be strengthened without violating the criterion of reciprocity.
The wide view likewise provides a way to respond to the integrity objection.
Rawls’s section on the wide view of public political culture is very different than other
parts of the “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” In the first sections of the paper, Rawls
attempts to show how legitimate basic principles of justice can be legislated and, indirectly, how
this strengthens stability for the right reasons. With the wide view, Rawls shifts his focus to a
concern with comprehensive doctrines in the public political sphere. Specifically, it seems as if
he is grappling with some form of the integrity objection. Rawls wants to make space in his
theory for “a positive ground for introducing such doctrines, which is not merely a defensive

43

Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 591.
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ground, as if their intrusion into public discussion were inevitable in any case.”44He ultimately
grounds this in a stability claim: without violating the criterion of reciprocity, the introduction of
comprehensive doctrines into the public political sphere of society strengthens the stability of
that society for the right reasons. Rawls shows this by means of the proviso, and by means of the
fundamental connection between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions of justice.
Rawls’ inclusion of the proviso in his theory is confusing, as given his language, he does not
intend the proviso to be an alternate means of justifying a basic principle of justice.45 Rather, he
states quite clearly: “It is important also to observe that the introduction into public political
culture of religious and secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature
and content of justification in public reason itself. This justification is still given in terms of a
family of reasonable political conceptions of justice.”46 Given this, the nature of the proviso
seems to be this: when debating about a basic principle of justice, so long as there is a public
reason forthcoming that I support, I can offer my own comprehensive doctrine as a reason I
support that basic principle of justice.
Rawls thinks that the proviso positively impacts the stability of society for the right
reasons: “when these doctrines accept the proviso and only then come into political debate, the
commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested.”47 Implicitly, Rawls seems to
understand that certain citizens will want to make use of their comprehensive doctrines in public
political discussion, and this will be important for the stability of society. However, since
political liberalism rejects the use of comprehensive doctrines as justifications, there must be a

44

Ibid., 593.
Rawls could make the claim that the proviso serves as a stand-in for before a majority of citizens possess reasonable
conceptions of the good. However this sort of argument belies the fact that Rawls is working in ideal theory where citizens are
already reasonable.
46
Ibid., 592.
47
Ibid., 592.
45
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positive space for these doctrines. By providing this space political liberalism strengthens these
citizens’ allegiance to democratic society, and does not harm legitimacy.
When discussing the wide view, Rawls makes a fairly distinctive remark about the nature
of political conceptions of justice: political conceptions of justice are themselves supported by
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.4849 This requires that citizens to be able to reconcile their
political conception of justice with their comprehensive doctrine. It is only when citizens
recognize that they can, at the very least, make their comprehensive doctrine consistent with their
political conception of justice that their allegiance to their political conception is assured. The
relationship between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions is not something minor
for Rawls. Rather, it is necessary: “we may think of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that
support society’s reasonable political conceptions as those conceptions’ vital social basis, giving
them enduring strength and vigor.”50 When a citizen shows to others the connection between his
or her political conception of justice, she is doing something positive: citizens understand that
their fellow citizens’ “allegiance to their political conceptions lie in their respective
comprehensive doctrines” and stability for the right reasons is increased.51
Citizens are actively encouraged to explain why it is they support the specific political
conception of justice that they support. If other citizens are concerned about their fellow citizens’
allegiance to the political conception of justice that they hold they can ask for an explanation.
The mere fact that a person can show that she believes that the most reasonable conception of

48

A reasonable comprehensive doctrine is just one held by a reasonable citizen. See, Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36.
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 592.
50
Ibid., 592.
51
Ibid., 592.

49
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justice for her, based upon her comprehensive doctrine, is enough to assure other citizens that
she has met her duty of civility.52
The proviso and the fundamental connection between comprehensive doctrines and
political conceptions provide two different ways to promote stability without violating the
criterion of reciprocity. The proviso allows citizens who recognize the importance of public
reasoning to introduce their comprehensive doctrine into public debate. This provides a place for
them to express their comprehensive doctrine in the public political sphere which increases their
allegiance to political liberalism. The connection between comprehensive doctrines and political
conceptions shows citizens that political liberalism does not require that people renounce their
comprehensive doctrines in public reasoning. Rather, it makes clear that the only reasons which a
citizen can give as public reasons are those that do not contradict his comprehensive doctrine.
We can think of the fundamental connection and the proviso as applying to two separate areas of
public reasoning. The fundamental connection is in effect when a citizen is deciding which
political conception of justice she supports. The proviso is in effect when a citizen is actively
deciding on basic principles of justice. These two aspects of the wide view of public political
discussion promote allegiance to the basic principles of justice of society and stability for the
right reasons.
It is important to note that the criterion of reciprocity is violated neither by the reliance of
political conceptions of justice upon comprehensive doctrines nor by the use of the proviso.
Because the justification for specific political conceptions of justice rests solely upon shared
political values, the fact that a person’s comprehensive doctrine is consistent with his political
conception of justice does not affect its reasonableness. In fact we may wish to make the stronger

52

Rawls does not require that this explanation abide by any sort of logical, rational, or evidential standards. He only argues that
whatever grounds they give have to be convincing for them. Ibid., 592.
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claim that it is unreasonable to expect that a person can hold a political conception of justice that
directly contradicts his comprehensive doctrine.53 Likewise the proviso does not violate the
criterion of reciprocity, because political liberals do not claim it to be an alternate criterion of
justification. Its role is merely to be explanatory, and to provide assurance to others that one is
arguing in “good faith.” This will have two separate components. The first is to show that one
understands that what justifies the conception is a specific ordering of shared political values.
The second is to show that part of what makes the conception reasonable is that it is consistent
with one’s own comprehensive doctrine. Thus far from violating the criterion of reciprocity, both
of these aspects of the wide view of public political culture strengthen the legitimacy of basic
principles of justice and the stability of society for the right reasons.
2.6

Defeating the Integrity Objection

Although Rawls does not specifically do so, it is possible to defeat the integrity objection
by means of the proviso. When citizens are debating in the public political forum, they can
appeal to their comprehensive doctrine, and do so in a way that does not violate the criterion of
reciprocity. The proviso allows for a person to at any time introduce his or her comprehensive
doctrine into the public political forum. This allows for a person to show others why he supports
the specific political conception of justice that he does, and why he thinks it is the most
reasonable conception for him to adopt. A citizen with integrity does not need to feel that his
comprehensive doctrine is being excluded from the public political sphere of society. Likewise,
the ability to discuss with others the way in which the political conception of justice one holds is
fundamentally connected with the comprehensive doctrine that one holds is essential to
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responding to integrity objectors. It shows them that religious citizens can have integrity and at
the same time abide by the criterion of reciprocity. Thus the proviso and the fundamental
connection between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions of justice carry not only
with them the benefit of strengthening the legitimacy of the basic principles of justice, but also
ensure that the criterion of reciprocity is not violated by public reasons.
I imagine that those who raise the integrity objection will find this response initially
unappealing. They may object that although this accounts for a role for comprehensive doctrines
in the public political sphere, it hardly accounts for the primacy that those with integrity think
those doctrines deserve. The only way that this primacy could be accounted for is by allowing
the reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines to serve as the basis of justification for basic
principles of justice. I, however, dispute that this is the case. It is not the case that integrity
requires that every action is dictated by one’s comprehensive doctrine. From Vallier, integrity
requires that comprehensive doctrines can explain actions and structure “reasons and plans.”54
Integrity objectors do not require that integrity be expressed in whatever way a person desires
without question. For example, a person may have integrity to a doctrine that requires him to
harm others. Political liberals do not see limiting his integrity as a problem. Thus limiting
integrity is not bad per se, but rather only bad when done unjustifiably. The fact that political
liberals limit integrity so as not to allow reasons based upon comprehensive doctrines to act as
public reasons is not itself bad if justifiable.
It is clear, further, that integrity is not completely restricted in the public political sphere.
Due to the proviso, any citizen can offer his comprehensive doctrine as an explanation for why
he supports a particular political conception of justice so long as the conception is reasonable.
Likewise the fundamental connection between a political conception of justice and a personal
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comprehensive doctrine promotes the duty of civility. Only when a personal comprehensive
doctrine supports a reasonable political conception of justice can the duty of civility be achieved.
In an important way one’s comprehensive doctrine does structure one’s public reasons. It is
wrong then to say that comprehensive doctrines lack the primacy they deserve in the public
political sphere. It is an open question whether he would hold the same political conception of
justice if he held a different comprehensive doctrine. The comprehensive doctrine, then, does
play an important role in his public reasoning.
It should be noted here that my account of the wide view of public political culture is not
uncontroversial among political liberals. Hartley and Watson, for example, believe that, in order
to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, comprehensive reasons must be excluded entirely from the
public political forum as justifications. The thrust of their argument is that if reasons are to count
as public, they must be shareable among all members of the public political forum. However, if
we are to take the fact of reasonable pluralism seriously, then by their nature comprehensive
reasons will not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and will not count as public.55 Thus, they say,
comprehensive reasons can serve as explanations, and certainly they may be important as
explanations. However, they cannot be public reasons.56
I do not think that my argument is subject to the criticism of exclusionary political
liberalism, however. In fact, I take the version of political liberalism I defend to be an
exclusionary account. I, like Hartley and Watson, believe that public reasons must be based
solely on political values. The fundamental connection between a person’s comprehensive
doctrine and his political conception of justice is purely explanatory. Its existence provides no
justification for adopting a specific political conception of justice. The idea that a person should
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have the ability to describe how her comprehensive doctrine can support or, at least not
contradict her political values is entirely consistent with Hartley and Watson’s explanatory
account of comprehensive values. The argument that I take Rawls to be making, and that I agree
with, is that the public affirmation of this connection will is positive, enhancing each citizen’s
allegiance to the basic principles of society. Likewise, it eliminates the feelings of alienation that
integrity objectors worry about. Thus, this connection should not be a problem for even
exclusionary political liberals.
It is possible that there may be some concern that citizens will support certain political
conceptions of justice merely because those conceptions are consistent with their comprehensive
doctrine. This would mean that citizens do not actually have allegiance to the basic principles of
society but rather see them only as a modus vivendi. However, this should not be a substantial
worry for political liberals. In a well-ordered society citizens do share political values and are
reasonable. This reasonableness will compel them to seek fair terms of cooperation and abide by
the criterion of reciprocity. If this is the case, then this worry is unnecessary: citizens will support
a political conception because that conception is reasonable.
If there is to be an objection to my account of the role of comprehensive values in the
public political sphere, it must be to my interpretation of Rawls’s proviso. Again, however, I
insist that the proviso is not a principle of justification. Rather, it is a principle of explanation.
When confronted with an issue of basic justice, a citizen has the ability to explain why he
supports a certain side based on his comprehensive doctrine, so long as there is a proper political
reason – that he possesses – which also enables him to support that side. It enables him to show
others that his comprehensive doctrine is not an obstacle that must be overcome in order for him
to enter the public political sphere; rather it is an important part of his decision making within it.
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Neither of these enables a citizen to make justifications on the basis of her comprehensive
doctrine. Therefore neither one of them is inconsistent with Hartley and Watson’s account.
2.7

Conclusion

The question of whether the exclusion of comprehensive doctrines in the public political
sphere is justifiable seems to be misplaced. If there is no exclusion, then it is a moot question.
Certainly political liberals place restrictions upon the ways in which a comprehensive doctrine
can be expressed in the public political sphere. However these restrictions originate in the
criterion of reciprocity and the fact of reasonable pluralism. Asking how these restrictions can be
justified to a reasonable citizen who recognizes these two conditions, seems to be missing the
point of what it means to be a reasonable citizen. Of course, certain objectors may think that this
view of reasonableness begs the question. By assuming that citizens are already reasonable, I
have made it so that they will find the exclusion of reasons based on comprehensive doctrines
consistent with the criterion of reciprocity. However in assuming reasonableness I merely follow
Vallier who thinks that the true potency of the integrity objection rests on its claim that public
reasoning and reciprocity are inconsistent and Rawls who thinks that persons who do not find
reciprocity appealing will not find public reasoning appealing. By the point someone has raised
the integrity objection, they have already assented to some version of reciprocity. Thus, those
who raise the integrity objection may still have problems with political liberalism. Yet, the
integrity objection cannot be one of them.
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3

CRITIQUING VALLIER AND GAUS’ REFORMULATION OF POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
3.1

Introduction

Due to the integrity objection, several political liberals have attempted to rework political
liberalism. Of these, the most notable are Gaus and Vallier in their paper “The Roles of Religious
Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity.”57 In that paper, Gaus and Vallier claim (1) that the
integrity objection is a valid criticism of political liberalism, and (2) that political liberalism is
confused due to three errors in its “core ideas.”58 The first error is the “Error of Consensus”
which is the idea that public reasons must be “shareable,”; The second is the “Error of
Symmetry,” or the idea that a public reason which rejects a principle of justice or constitutional
essential must be subject to the same requirements of reciprocity that its affirmative counterpart
is subject to. The third error is the “Error of Deliberation as Constitutive of Justification.” This is
the idea that deliberative democracy is the best form of governance for public reasoning. Gaus
and Vallier think that these three errors are separable into two distinct categories. Recognizing
the first two errors will give us reason to believe political liberals “are committed to far more
permissive principles of restraint” than they currently are. Recognizing the third error will
destroy “the attraction of any principle of restraint.”59 Since the third error is an attack on the
very idea that public reasoning should take place within a deliberative democracy I take it as a
very different criticism than the first. This is an attack on political liberalism itself and not a
response to the integrity objection. Thus, I shall leave aside the third error and focus solely on
the first and second. I show that the alleged error of consensus results from a belief that the
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integrity objection is a substantive objection to political liberalism, which I deny, and from a
flawed understanding of what consensus actually requires. Likewise I argue that Gaus and
Vallier do not sufficiently take into account the circumstances of political liberalism when
positing the error of symmetry. Keeping a law from being passed due solely to reasons based on
a comprehensive doctrine still requires imposing one’s comprehensive view on another and thus
must be avoided when voting on basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials. Thus, I
argue neither of these criticisms are actually errors but important features of political liberalism.
3.2

The Errors of Political Liberalism

Gaus and Vallier take the integrity objection to be a problem for political liberalism.
Many religious citizens endorse liberal values; however they do not affirm political liberalism
due to the fact that it restricts the kinds of reasons that can count as justifications for the basic
principles of justice. Gaus and Vallier do not believe that this is a problem with political
liberalism per se. Rather they believe that: “a commitment to public justification [public
reasoning] provides no grounds for excluding religious reasons from politics.”(Gaus and Vallier 52)
The fact that political liberals do exclude religious reasons from politics is an “error of
explication” rather than an error in theory.60 Gaus and Vallier posit two substantial problems in
the explication of political liberalism that cause the unjustified exclusion of religious reasons.
The first problem that Gaus and Vallier raise is the error of consensus. The error of
consensus is caused by political liberalism’s “shareability requirement” for public reason.61
Shareability, here, means “that we all affirm the same justifying reasons as conclusive” when
deciding on basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials.62 “If R is a conclusive reason
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(or part of one) for Alf accepting L, shareability requires that it also be such a reason for
Betty.”63 Gaus and Vallier claim that Rawls’s criterion of reciprocity is one such shareability
requirement. Yet, the problem with a shareability requirement is that it seems “hostile to any
genuinely pluralistic reasoning in public justification.”64 As Gaus and Vallier point out, in order
for everyone to have the same reasons, they must all reason in the same way. However,
according to Rawls, the fact of reasonable pluralism means persons will never reason identically.
Thus, Gaus and Vallier think that shareability reduces public reasoning from “a problem of
choice among people who disagree” to “a choice by one person.”65 If true, then in order for the
standard account of political liberalism to function, it must deny the fact of reasonable pluralism.
However, political liberals see public reasoning as a response to the problems posed by the fact
of reasonable pluralism. Thus, the requirement of consensus must be an error.
In the place of shareability, Gaus and Vallier introduce a “convergence conception of public
justification.”66 In order for a reason to meet a convergence requirement, citizens must be able to
see their fellow citizens’ reasons for endorsing a specific principle of justice as reasons. If A is to
see B as having a public reason, then “he must think, or at least have reason to suppose, that
Betty really does have reason to endorse the law.”67 Suppose A is an atheist, B is a Christian, and
C makes all of his decisions based on what he hears from woodland animals. Within this
conception of political liberalism, A, B, and C can all introduce their comprehensive reasons for
why they support or reject a specific principle of justice. A and B will be able to accept each
other’s reasons as public because even though they disagree, they still find those reasons
intelligible. However neither A nor B will be able to recognize C’s justification as a reason to
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support a principle of justice. Therefore, A’s and B’s justifications will be public reasons, but C’s
justification will not. For the reasons listed in their argument against the “error of consensus”
Gaus and Vallier find a convergence requirement for public reasons preferable to a consensus
requirement.
The second error of explication in political liberalism is the error of symmetry. Gaus and
Vallier claim that, even if political liberals were to find the error of consensus argument wrong,
they would still be inappropriately weighing the importance of religious reasons in a politically
liberal society. This is because these standard political liberals reject that religious beliefs can
perform the “defeater role” in public reasoning.68 According to Gaus and Vallier, political
liberals are committed both to integrity and non-domination.69 In this context, non-domination
refers to the fact that although citizens have every right to be faithful to their comprehensive
doctrines, this fidelity does not extend to “coerc[ing] others to live by one’s own light.”70
However, if the criterion of reciprocity requires that support and opposition to principles of
justice and constitutional essentials must be justified solely with shared political values then
requiring public reasons may violate the principle of non-domination. Vallier and Gaus consider
the example of the debate on public education. In our current educational system, there are
debates that occur between those who think that education should promote “shared democratic
values” and those who think that promoting democratic values violates “the religious
commitments of some citizens about the way they are to raise their children.”71 In a politically
liberal society, citizens will debate the role of education in the public political forum, and will be
obligated to offer only public reasons as justification for their positions. Thus, although a public
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justification can readily be offered for an educational system that promotes shared democratic
values, there may be no public justification for those religious persons who desire their freedom
of conscience. Yet, this violation of the principle of non-domination is exactly what liberals seek
to avoid. Thus, according to Gaus and Vallier, “even if a secular rationale is necessary in our
society for a publicly justified law, it can be defeated by a reasonable religious conviction
without any secular backing.”72
3.3

Disputing Shareability

The first problem with the “error of consensus” critique of political liberalism, is that it
misrepresents the claims of political liberals. Gaus and Vallier claim that in order for something
to count as a public reason, all citizens must see that reason “as conclusive.”73 Thus if I were to
attempt to justify a principle of justice by means of reason A, every other citizen must see A as a
reason for them to adopt that principle of justice in order for A to count as a public reason. 74 Yet
there is no requirement in political liberalism that there can only be one public reason for any
principle of justice or constitutional essential. Rawls’s own discussion on issues such as abortion
indicate that for any given principle of justice there can be multiple public reasons given to
support or reject that principle.75
However, Gaus and Vallier’s argument is not that political liberals do not provide
nominal support for there being diversity in public reasons among different citizens of a wellordered society. Rather they argue that shareability will inevitably lead to there actually being
only one set of public reasons that will hold in society. This leads to the second problem with the
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error of consensus. Here, it is useful to consider how the fact of reasonable pluralism is
accounted for by political liberals. There are two distinct ways this is done. The first way is
obvious. Political liberals require that only public reasons based on shared political values can be
appealed to in the public political sphere. This is what Gaus and Vallier are attacking. However
the second way is just as important as the first. Although citizens offer public reasons based upon
shared political values, these reasons will be invariably different from one another. As Rawls
says, “since [political values] can be interpreted in various ways, we get different formulations of
the principles of justice and different contents of public reasons.”76 Due to the burdens of
judgment citizens will ascribe different weights to these different values. For example, one
citizen may weigh freedom of religion over freedom of movement. This will cause him to favor
principles which he believes give appropriate weight to his freedom of religion. Yet it is
possible, and likely, one or many other citizens will disagree with his ordering of political values.
This leads us to two separate conclusions. First, it is not the case that there will only be
one set of public reasons. If we truly respect the fact of reasonable pluralism, there is no way this
could be the case. Denying this would be as egregious as insisting on a conception of public
justification that “assumes we reason identically.”77 The second conclusion is, that if people can
disagree with each other’s public reasons, then the shareability requirement of political
liberalism cannot be as stringent as Gaus and Vallier claim it is.
Rawls presents a less troubling shareability requirement. In formulating political
liberalism, Rawls is particularly interested in how a political decision maker can “justify his or

76

Ibid., 582.

77

Gaus and Vallier, “Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity,” 58.

27

her political decisions to everyone.”78Rawls thinks that he solves this with his principle of
legitimacy:
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over
generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they
consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms,
even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those
terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms
of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as
free and equal citizens . . . Citizens will of course differ as to which conceptions of justice they think the
most reasonable, but they will agree that all are reasonable, even if barely so.79

Thus, Rawls does not require that public reasons be shareable in the sense specified by Gaus and
Vallier. Presumably this is for the same reason that those two point out: a shareability
requirement would deny the fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls requires that citizens, because
they accept the burdens of judgment, offer only those reasons which they believe other citizens
can accept. This means offering public reasons based on their political conceptions of justice.
People must argue for their political conceptions of justice solely on the basis of their shared
political values, without attempting to smuggle in any comprehensive doctrine. Other citizens
accept these public reasons as reasonable, not because they actually share the reasons, but
because they are formulated in this way.
The only shareability requirement that Rawls has, then, is that citizens must actually be
reasonable. However if being reasonable means acknowledging the burdens of judgment, how
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could it ever be the case that there would be only one set of public reasons? This would violate
the burdens of judgment.
If Gaus and Vallier are denying that citizens in an ideal society actually share basic
liberal principles, they may actually have a criticism for political liberalism. Yet, first, the
argument given is not sufficient to show this point; and, second, this does not entitle them to
make the claim that they are merely reformulating political liberalism rather than disregarding it.
3.4

Problems with a Convergence Conception of Public Justification

Thus far, I have denied that there is an error of consensus in Rawlsian political liberalism.
However, this is not yet enough to show that a convergence conception of public justification is
inherently flawed. It may be the case that both Rawls’s and Gaus and Vallier’s models are
workable formulations of political liberalism. If this is true, then people can decide between the
two models, when determining which formulation of political liberalism to aim for. However, I
think there are at least some flaws to consider when evaluating convergence conceptions of
political liberalism.
In their account of a convergence conception of political liberalism, Gaus and Vallier
give an example of how their intelligibility requirement will work. Citizens will give
comprehensive reasons for why they support basic principles of justice. In turn other citizens will
decide whether they accept the reasons given as public based upon whether they can understand
them as reasons. So a Christian can accept an atheist’s reasons as public reasons and vice versa.
Yet neither an atheist nor a Christian can accept the reasons of one who figures out what he will
do based on what the woodland creatures tell him. Christian and atheist views are reasonable
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because other citizens can see them as reasons. The views of a person who listens to woodland
creatures are not reasonable because others cannot see them as reasons.80
Yet this raises an interesting question. Why is it the case that an atheist will find the
views of a Christian reasonable? Imagine that a Christian is attempting to provide a justification
for why a society should restrict abortion. He states that, due to his religious beliefs, he believes
that every life is sacred and inviolable. Further, life begins at conception. Thus abortion should
be impermissible. An atheist may rightly respond: “Your justification depends upon a theistic
belief which I do not share with you. Why should I accept what you have to say?” The problem
is accentuated in this case because not only is the atheist dubious about the Christian’s
justification, he also disagrees with his conclusion. Gaus and Vallier may counter that even
though the atheist does not share the Christian’s beliefs, he can see how if a Christian believed
that life is sacred, it would lead him to believe that abortion should be impermissible. Yet, even
this is problematic. For if this is what Gaus and Vallier are arguing for, then there should be no
reason to restrict the views of the man who listens to animals as unreasonable. If a man actually
did believe that animals tell him to have liberal values, then he would have every reason to argue
for liberal principles of justice and constitutional essentials.
Gaus and Vallier apparently foresee this dilemma. When discussing the kinds of values
which are intelligible, they claim that because citizens recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism,
“all accept that reasoning on the basis of these different values is within the range of the
intelligible use of human reason on these difficult matters.”81 Specifically there is a range of
“reasonably pluralistic considerations” that citizens draw upon when making decisions. Thus
Gaus and Vallier believe that the person who listens to animals will fall outside of the sphere of
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these reasonably pluralistic considerations and therefore will not be reasonable. However, “many
religious considerations” will not fall outside of these consideration, thus these beliefs will be
reasonable. Therefore there is a principled difference between religious beliefs which are
intelligible and idiosyncratic beliefs which are not. Yet, Gaus and Vallier do not define what a
reasonable range of pluralistic considerations would look like. Nor do they give criteria for
determining what these are in any given society.
Further, it seems like Gaus and Vallier’s reasons for intelligibility are not necessary. The
two seem to want to make it so that many recognizably reasonable comprehensive doctrines will
be in a politically liberal society. Yet Rawls already accomplishes this with his account of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A reasonable comprehensive doctrine has three
requirements. First, and most importantly for this discussion, it is an “exercise of theoretical
reason” which covers the “religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or
less consistent and coherent manner.”82 Second, it is an exercise of practical reason in ordering
the values attained from the first requirement into a coherent moral system. Third, it is reasons
responsive. This means that a person, when discussing his comprehensive doctrine, is open to the
possibility that there are parts of his doctrine which are incorrect and will shift his beliefs if
given adequate reasons. Given this account, it seems like the person who listens to nature could
not possibly have a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. For it does not seem like he is making
adequate use of his theoretical reason, and his doctrine is not reasons responsive. On the other
hand we can envision several Christians and atheists with reasonable comprehensive doctrines.83
So it seems like Rawls already defines the realm of the reasonable in the way that Gaus and
Vallier want to.
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So, Rawls seems to think two separate things are necessary for persons to be reasonable.
First they must hold a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Second, they must offer public
reasons for the principles of justice and basic constitutional essentials they support because they
recognize the burdens of judgment. Gaus and Vallier seem to want to get around this requirement
by stating that the only thing that is required for public justification is the first requirement. But,
in doing this, they seem to be operating on a very different definition of reasonableness than
most political liberals. I can accept that another person has a reasonable comprehensive doctrine,
but that alone is not sufficient for me to agree to be coerced by a principle of justice which I do
not agree with that he justifies with his comprehensive doctrine. Thus, there is no reason to
support an intelligibility requirement.
3.5

Defending Symmetry

One part of public reasoning that is often misinterpreted is the division between reasons
which are public and those which are secular. Rawls is explicit that these two sets of reasons
come apart: “Such doctrines and values [secular doctrines] are much too broad to serve the
purposes of public reason. Political values are not moral doctrines, however available or
accessible these may be to our reason and common sense reflection.”84 Gaus and Vallier seem to
believe that “only secular beliefs can enter into public justification,” or, in other words, only
secular reasons can count as public reasons85 If this is what objectors believe, it is no wonder that
they would think that public reasons automatically privilege secular comprehensive doctrines.
Yet we must remember that Rawls prohibits this very thing: “[Political values] are not puppets
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manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive doctrines.”86 This distinction is important
to keep in mind for in the discussion of the error of symmetry.
The example of a parent being able to choose where she educates her children versus
mandatory public schooling is an interesting one for the error of asymmetry. Gaus and Vallier
present two different reasons a religious person might have for favoring choice over public
schooling. First, (PR) parents have a right to choose how their children are educated.87 This is a
right that falls within the domain of public reasoning. Second, public schooling would violate
their religious integrity. There are a few different versions of this second objection and Gaus and
Vallier, unfortunately, do not specify which version they think the most appropriate. However,
let us assume that there are two plausible versions: (1) I have a right to inculcate my children
according to my religious values; public education would hinder my ability to do so. (2)
Democratic values are incompatible with my comprehensive doctrine and thus I must object to
the attempt to inculcate my children with those values. However, if we pay attention to the
distinction between secular and public reasons made at the beginning of this section, then we
must discard (2) almost immediately. The criterion of reciprocity requires that citizens share
political values in order to be reasonable. If citizens do not, in fact, share those values then they
are not reasonable. It is not these citizens, then, who we should care about in the public political
sphere.
If Gaus and Vallier are right about the symmetry objection, they must be referring to
argument (1) or a reasonable variant of this position. Yet even this position has flaws. First, it is
unclear precisely how (1) is so significantly different than (PR) that one must abandon public
reasoning in order to adopt it. If what is at stake is that this person clearly feels that he and others
86
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should have the right to educate their children how they see fit, then religion seems to have
nothing to do with it. If he feels that he is entitled to a special status because of his religion, then
he is merely being unreasonable. Second, a reasonable person should not see education in
democratic values as something inherently wrong. This is where the distinction between secular
values and political values becomes important. If it were the case that public values are really
shareable secular values, then a religious person may rightly have to fear that a public education
will be harmful to his desire to raise his children as he see fits. Yet an education which merely
inculcates liberal values will not be prone to this critique. Granted, it will not foster
comprehensive values, but as Rawls says “we must each give up forever the hope of changing
the constitution so as to establish our religion’s hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as
to ensure its influence and success.”88
Thus, if persons are reasonable – and this is a requirement of the idealization of a wellordered society – then they will see all public reasons as reasonable, regardless of whether the
principles of justice these reasons support would violate these persons’ interests. Thus, just
because some principles’ adoption would harm the interests of certain citizens does not give
these citizens a reasonable right to reject to these principles. This means that a reasonable
citizen’s commitments to fair terms of cooperation will let him see public reasons – so long as
they are public reasons – as reasonable, and thus acceptable. Further, at least in this specific case,
the means to vote against certain principles of justice based on public reasons is still present.
Given this citizen’s core commitments it is quite possible, if not likely, that he will be able to
provide a public reason for this position based on his political conception of justice.
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3.6

Conclusion

Gaus and Vallier’s errors of explication are based on the belief that the integrity objection
of political liberalism is a good objection. Thus, someone who already doubted this objection
would already be predisposed to see their claims that political liberalism contains “errors of
explication” as dubious. However, even if we were to assume that the integrity objection was a
damning critique of political liberalism, this would still not provide sufficient evidence to agree
with Gaus and Vallier. The error of consensus is based upon an overly strong reading of public
reasons that they must be shareable. Public reasons need only be based on shared political
values. If Gaus and Vallier’s objection is that this is too demanding, then this would throw the
very idea of political liberalism as a theory into doubt. Further, the idea that convergence is a
plausible alternative has the unfortunate consequence of potentially ruling out otherwise
reasonable persons from engaging in political activity. Holding this view also commits them to
passing the buck of reasonableness from reasonable beliefs onto reasonable persons without
giving a sufficient account of what it means to be a reasonable person. Finally the error of
symmetry seems to be based on a lack of distinction between public and secular reasons. It is
unclear why being coerced into accepting a principle of justice that you disagree with on
comprehensive grounds entitles you to being able to justify your disagreement based on those
grounds. The religious citizens in question are reasonable and thus accept the coercion as
reasonable. Thus I find that Gaus and Vallier’s critiques of standard political liberalism – or at
the very least Rawlsian political liberalism – do not possess weight.
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